Labor Market Regimes and the Effects of Monetary Policy by Acocella, Nicola et al.
 * douglas@douglas-hibbs.com 
   Douglas.Hibbs@cefos.gu.se 
 
 
 
Centrum för forskning om offentlig sektor – Center for Public Sector Research 
www.cefos.gu.se 
Labor market regimes and the 
effects of monetary policy 
CEFOS Working Paper 2 
2005 
Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo 
Department of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza 
 
Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.* 
CEFOS 
Abstract 
In this paper we use a standard multi-union, monopolistic competition model to 
investigate the qualitative and quantitative responses of inflation and unemployment to 
monetary policy activism under different institutional arrangements in the labor market, 
which are defined by the rigidity of nominal wages. We show that the effects of monetary 
policy on the real economy depend critically on the wage formation regime, and on the 
ways in which the restrictiveness of policy interacts with product price competition, with 
union centralization, and with the weight placed on real wage premiums as compared to 
unemployment in unions’ optimal programs. Our interpretation of the results emphasizes 
how the posture of monetary policy toward inflation influences the strategic calculations 
that drive union wage setting behavior in different institutional settings. 
 
  
 
CEFOS Working Paper 2 
Labor market regimes and the effects of monotary policy 
  
© Nicola Acocella, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., 2005 
 
ISSN: 1653-3895 
  
CEFOS 
Centrum för forskning om offentlig sektor 
Göteborgs universitet 
Box 720 
405 30 Göteborg 
office@cefos.gu.se 
Tel. 031-773 41 42 
www.cefos.gu.se
 CEFOS 
Center for Public Sector Research 
Göteborg University 
P.O. Box 720 
SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden 
office@cefos.gu.se 
Tel. +46 31 773 41 42 
www.cefos.gu.se 
 1
Final Revision 2006 05 12  
 
 
Labor market regimes and the effects 
of monetary policy† 
Nicola Acocella*, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo*, and Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.** 
forthcoming in Journal of Macreconomics 
 
Abstract  
In this paper we use a standard multi-union, monopolistic competition model to evaluate 
analytically and numerically the effects of monetary policy on inflation and unemployment 
under different institutional arrangements in the labor market that are defined by the rigidity 
of nominal wages. We show that the effects of monetary policy on the real economy depend 
critically on the wage formation regime, and on the ways in which the restrictiveness of 
policy interacts with product price competition, wage setting centralization and the utility 
weight unions place on real wage premiums as compared to unemployment. Our 
interpretation of the results emphasizes how the posture of monetary policy toward inflation 
influences the strategic calculations driving unions’ wage setting behavior in different 
institutional environments.  
 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, J51. 
Keywords: Policy games, monetary policy neutrality, trade unions, monopolistic 
competition, labor markets. 
 
 
 
* Department of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza. 
 
** Corresponding author: Douglas Hibbs, CEFOS, Göteborg University, Box 720, Göteborg 40530, 
Sweden; douglas@douglas-hibbs.com 
 
                                                          
†Acocella and Di Bartolomeo gratefully acknowledge financial support from the University of Rome La 
Sapienza; Hibbs is grateful for support from the Göteborg University Donationsfonder. An earlier version of this 
paper appeared as Working Paper No 58 of the Public Economics Department, University of Rome La Sapienza. 
 2
1. Monetary policy, wage setting institutions and macroeconomic performance 
Monetary policy neutrality means that monetary instruments are unable to affect real 
variables, such as output and employment.1 The Barro-Gordon (1983) model and its many 
variants, inspired by the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977), are the main 
templates for modern analysis of monetary policy issues. In terms of the framework used in 
this paper and laid out below, the bare-bones Barro-Gordon setup corresponds to a game in 
which the central bank sets the money supply in order to minimize inflation and 
unemployment after unions set nominal wages so as to optimally trade off expected real 
wages and unemployment of their members. Although unions are Stackelberg leaders, the 
central bank’s objectives and optimal policy reactions are common knowledge and union 
wage policies are conditioned on rational expectations of the money supply. Nominal wages 
are therefore adjusted to crowd-out the positive effects that monetary expansions otherwise 
would have on output and employment by moderating real wages. The result is a Stackelberg 
equilibrium characterized by monetary neutrality and excess inflation.2  
A more favorable implication of this line of research is that a “conservative” central bank 
pursuing a stringent, non-accommodating policy is able to contain inflation without real costs 
in the form of systematically higher unemployment and depressed output – a view developed 
theoretically by Rogoff (1985) and supported to various degrees empirically by evidence in 
Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), Bleaney (1996) and Eijffinger et al. (1998)) 
and others, all of which took ratings of central bank independence as good proxies for policy 
conservatism. Non-neutrality was shown to arise, however, if wages only partially adjust to 
monetary changes because of the existence of multi-period overlapping contracts – as in 
Fischer (1977) – or because the policy authority has an information advantage over wage and 
price setters – as in Canzoneri (1985) – or because unions have a pure distaste for inflation – 
as in Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994).  
                                                          
1 The classical definition of monetary neutrality implies that autonomous changes in the money supply have no 
influence on the level of real output (Patinkin (1956)). In the policy games literature which came a generation 
later, money is typically endogenous. A definition better suited to modern frameworks of analysis would be that 
monetary policy is neutral (non-neutral) when equilibrium output and employment do not (do) depend on the 
preferences of the monetary policymaker (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004)). 
2 Union power over nominal wage setting, however, might influence the monetary authority’s objectives and 
constraints. Fischer and Summers (1989), for example, argued that other things being equal indexation lowers 
the cost of inflation, which by itself gives the authorities an incentive to pursue more inflationary policies. The 
implication is that union coordination effectively indexing wages would tend to increase inflation. On the other 
hand, Waller and VanHoose (1992) pointed out that indexation steepens the aggregate supply curve, reducing 
the output and employment gains from (unanticipated) inflation. The incentive to pursue an inflationary policy 
in the first instance is therefore diminished, implying that through this channel coordinated union action to index 
wages might reduce an inflation bias.  
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More recent contributions to the policy game literature stress new channels of monetary non-
neutrality that do not depend on sticky wages, information asymmetries and direct union 
aversion to inflation, but instead operate through the interaction of central bank policies with 
wage and price setting institutions. Theoretical demonstrations by Bratiosis and Martin 
(1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000), Coricelli et al. (2004, 2005), among others, implied that 
when there is a multiplicity of wage setting unions and product markets are monopolistically 
competitive, a Barro-Gordon framework may deliver policy non-neutrality. In particular, 
restrictive monetary policy rules that are internalized by wage and/or price setters can lead to 
favorable equilibrium outcomes for output and unemployment as well as inflation. Data 
reported in Soskice and Iversen (2000) and more extended empirical analyses by Hall (1994), 
Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen (1999 ch.3), Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Franzese 
(2001a, 2002 ch.4), which tested explicitly for the contingency of real monetary policy 
effects on the institutional framework of wage/price formation, yielded evidence broadly 
supporting this line of theory, although in his masterful review of these and related studies 
Franzese (2001b) conceded that “disagreement remains over the precise nature of these 
interactive effects” (p.457). 
The aim of this paper is help clarify the sources and potential numerical magnitudes of 
institutionally contingent monetary non-neutrality. Specifically, we apply a workhorse multi-
union, monopolistic competition model to pin down analytically and evaluate numerically the 
nominal and real macroeconomic effects of monetary policy in two distinct wage formation 
regimes: (i) “rigid” wage labor markets in which unions contract wages in advance for at 
least one period (commitment) and cannot alter their claims after the monetary authority acts, 
and (ii) “flexible” wage markets in which unions interact simultaneously with the central 
bank and may adjust wages freely in any period.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the 
workhorse multi-union, monopolistic competition model. Solutions to the optimal programs 
of the central bank and labor unions are given in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive analytic 
solutions for wages, prices and unemployment levels in flexible and rigid wage labor 
markets, and we show the qualitative responses of these variables to variations in monetary 
policy conservativeness, centralization-coordination of wage setting, and price competition in 
product markets. In Section 5 we assign plausible ranges of numerical values to model 
parameters, and we calculate the quantitative effects of monetary policy conservativeness on 
macroeconomic outcomes under different assumptions about wage setting centralization, 
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price competition, and the relative weight placed upon real wages vs. unemployment by 
unions operating in flexible and rigid wage institutional regimes. We give intuitive 
interpretations of the results, placing special emphasis on how the posture of policy in 
different institutional settings affects the strategic calculations of unions in setting nominal 
wage levels. 
 
2.  The economic setup 
We use a simple, workhorse model3 of an imperfectly competitive economy composed of 
several unions and monopolistically competitive firms. Several unions represent the entire 
labor force and exert monopoly power over nominal wage levels.4 We index unions by 
[ ]1,i n∈  and for simplicity assume they are equal in size, each representing a share of the 
labor force equal to 1/ nσ = . An array of firms producing differentiated goods and services 
set product prices. One union represents the labor force and sets the nominal wage of workers 
in each firm. Firms associated with union i are indexed by ij.  
Firms maximize a one period profit function under demand and production technology 
constraints. Firm-level demand is  
(1) ijdij
P MY
P P
η−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
where dijY  is demand for a firm’s output, and ijP  and P  are firm-product prices and the 
general price level, respectively. The latter is conveniently assumed to equal the geometric 
average of ijP . ( )1,η ∈ ∞  is the elasticity of product demand with respect to relative price. 
Firm-level demand is also affected by aggregate demand, which equals the aggregate real 
money supply M
P
. The central bank controls aggregate demand perfectly by setting the 
money supply at any given price level. 
Each firm uses a production technology defined by decreasing returns to labor inputs 
(2) ij ijY L
α=   ( )0,1α ∈  
                                                          
3 The Appendix gives fuller derivation of the economic setup which draws upon Bratiosis and Martin (1999), 
Soskice and Iversen (2000), and especially Coricelli et al. (2005) and Cukierman (2004).  
4 The model therefore is not applicable to economies in which wages are set mainly by individual bargains, as in 
the contemporary US, or to (notional) economies in which wages are mainly set by just one all-encompassing 
union. This point is made explicit in analyses of the model presented ahead. 
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where ijL  is the labor input of firm ij. Note that technological progress (secular productivity) 
is implicitly fixed at 1.0. 
Equations (1) and (2) imply that firm ij’s conditions for profit maximization under 
monopolistic competition can be written as log-linear equations for relative product price and 
labor demand  
(3) ( )( ) ( )1ij ip p m p w pθ α α− = − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
(4) ( )dij il m p w pθ η= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
where lower case variables denote logs of the corresponding upper case variables, iw  is the 
log nominal wage level of workers in union i and ( ) ( )
10,1
1
θ α η α∈ = + − . 
As shown in the appendix, without loss of generality we set log labor supply parametrically 
to zero, from which it follows that the unemployment rate among union i’s members implied 
by equation (4) is  
(5) ( ) ( )i iU w p m pθ η= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
Taking averages of equations (3) and (4), one obtains (as shown in the Appendix) the 
following aggregate reduced forms for the log price level and the rate of unemployment in 
the macroeconomy: 
(6) ( )1p w mα α= + −  
(7) U w m= − . 
By using equation (6) we can rewrite equation (5) as  
(8) ( )1i iU w w mθ η α η= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  
Equation (8) implies that the unemployment rate of union i’s members is positively related to 
union i’s log nominal wage claims, iw , and negatively related to the economy-wide, average 
log nominal wage level, w . The union-specific wage always dominates the economy-wide 
wage because ( )1η α η> − . Unemployment is also decreasing in the nominal money supply.  
The economy-wide log nominal wage level is equal to ( )1i iw w wσ σ −= + − , where recall 
1
n
σ =  is the relative size of union i’s membership (which is equivalent to the degree of 
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centralization or coordination of nominal wage setting), and iw−  is the average log nominal 
wage set by other unions. It follows that equation (8) can be expressed  
(9) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 1 1i i iU w w mθ η ασ η α σ η −= − − − − − − . 
Equation (9) is the reduced form unemployment rate for union i. When setting the nominal 
wage, union i faces two opposite effects. First, raising iw  decreases employment demand for 
the union’s members due to the higher labor costs imposed on the firm. Second, raising iw  
contributes to increasing the economy-wide wage, which by itself makes firm ij more 
competitive. The former effect naturally dominates the latter whenever wages are set by more 
than one union. 
 
3.  Optimal policies 
3.1  The central bank’s problem 
We assume that the central bank sets the log money supply m to maximize the following 
quadratic objective function, subject to (6) and (7): 
(10) 
2
2
2 2
UCB β π= − −  
where ( )1p pπ −= −  is the inflation rate and ( )0,β ∈ ∞  defines the central bank’s aversion to 
inflation (or deflation) relative to unemployment. For a one period optimal policy, the lagged 
price level, 1p− , is given parametrically, and so without loss of generality it can be set to 
zero, allowing us to treat current prices and inflation rates interchangeably; pπ = . 
Solving the central bank’s problem yields the wage-contingent optimal monetary policy rule 
(11) m wφ= − . 
The reaction parameter ( )( )2
1 1
1 1
α α βφ α β
− −= − +  represents the central bank’s willingness to 
accommodate nominal wage settlements, which we shall call monetary policy 
“conservativeness.” When ( )
1
1
β α α< −  and therefore 0φ < , wage increases are at least 
partly accommodated, and the central bank is “liberal” or “populist.” As β  goes to its lower 
bound of zero, φ approaches the lower bound of its domain, -1, and the central bank is ultra-
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liberal. Its objective function is targeted solely on minimizing the unemployment rate and 
monetary policy accommodates fully nominal wage increases. The reverse is true when 
( )
1
1
β α α> − . In this case 0φ >  and the central bank is conservative, setting the money 
supply so as to offset at least partly wage-induced increases to the price level. As the bank’s 
inflation aversion parameter β  goes to its upper limit ∞ , φ approaches its upper bound, 
α /(1−α),  and we observe the ultra-conservative central bank that aims only to minimize 
inflation. At ( )
1
1
β α α= − , the reaction coefficient 0φ = . The central bank is “passive” and 
monetary policy is neither accommodating nor non-accommodating.5 
3.2  The labor unions’ problem  
Each union seeks to maximize a linear-quadratic preference function, iTU , with the 
membership’s log real wage ( )iw p−  and unemployment rate ( )iU  as arguments:  
(12) ( ) 2
2
i
i i
UTU w pγ= − −   { }1, 2,...i n∈  
where 0γ >  is the relative utility weight of the log real wage premium.6  
The first order condition for each union i is  
(13) 1 0ii
i i
Up U
w w
γ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂− − =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  
where recall that the current period log price level, p , defines the inflation rate, π . The first 
order condition (13) represents the sensitivity of union wage policies to inflation and 
unemployment, respectively. As will become clear in the next section, after substitution for 
the endogenous variables π  and iU  we obtain the corresponding optimality condition in 
terms of parameters and given variables. 
 
4.  Labor market regimes 
                                                          
5 Hence, at a productivity parameter of 2 3α =  (the typical value for advanced economies), policy would be 
passive when the Central Bank’s utility weight on inflation relative to unemployment, β , is equal to 4.5. Values 
greater or less than 4.5 therefore define what we call “conservative” and “liberal” policies, respectively. 
6 The real wage is the net-of-productivity premium because the production function in (2) excludes 
technological progress, and this implies that under perfect competition the equilibrium values of w, p, m and U 
are normalized to zero. These features of the model should be kept in mind when interpreting the settings of γ  
and other parameters in section 5.1. 
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4.1  Regimes and information 
Equilibrium outcomes of the game are obtained by solving equations (11) and (13) under the 
unions’ information constraint. Different equilibrium concepts are associated with different 
information settings and associated specifications of expectations and, therefore, they vary by 
labor market regime. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2000) discussion, a Stackelberg 
game implies that unions maximize their objectives by internalizing the central bank’s 
reaction to their wage policies, and they cannot change nominal wages thereafter (because, 
for example, wages are bound by non-renegotiable contracts extending more that one period). 
Consequently, this regime is associated with pre-determined wages set one period in advance. 
By contrast, in a non-cooperative Nash gaming environment unions and the monetary 
authority interact simultaneously, taking realizations of m  and iw , respectively, as given. 
What we designate a Nash game therefore implies flexible wages that can be adjusted every 
period along with the money supply. In both flexible and rigid wage labor markets 
monopolistic firms set prices after the realizations of wages and the money supply. The 
sequences of moves can be depicted 
Unions ? Central Bank (“Stackelberg”) ? Firms  
Unions & Central Bank (“Nash”) ? Firms. 
Both wage setting regimes are plausible. The Stackelberg leader-follower setup is consistent 
with the fact that in unionized economies wages are normally set one or more years in 
advance, whereas the central bank in principle can adjust monetary instruments with great 
frequency, giving it considerable flexibility vis-à-vis wage outcomes. On the other hand, 
monetary policy effects may be sluggish, which motivates the view that Nash solution 
concepts yield reasonable “one-shot” approximations to a repeated game between unions and 
the monetary authority. The most appropriate characterization of the labor market regime 
may therefore depend on the lag structure of policy effects, which for reasons outside the 
scope of this paper could well vary across time and space.  
4.2  Flexible labor markets 
In the Nash flexible wage case, each union finds the nominal wage that maximizes its 
objectives by differentiating the aggregate price (inflation) constraint in (6) and the 
unemployment function in (9) with respect to iw , taking both the money supply, m , and the 
nominal wages of other unions, iw− , as given, and substituting these derivatives into the 
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optimality condition in (13). Each union i’s optimality condition in flexible wage markets is 
then 
(14) ( ) ( )( )1 1 0iUγ ασ θ η ασ η− − ⋅ − − =  
which implies the wage setting function(s)  
(15) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2
1 1 1 1
1 0
1 1 1i i
w m w
η α η α σ η η α ηγ αση ασ η η ασ η η ασ η−
⎞⎛− − − − − −= + + − >⎟⎜ ⎟− − − − − −⎝ ⎠
 
for { }1, 2,...i n∈ . 
Union i always reacts to monetary expansion by raising its wage claims less than 
proportionally, since the positive coefficient of m  in (15) is always less than one, except 
when all workers are represented by a single union ( 1σ = ), in which case the reaction 
coefficient on m  is unity. Moreover, union i always responds to increases in the average 
wage of other unions by raising its nominal wage, no matter how conservative the central 
bank is. 
The Nash equilibrium is found by solving the system of 1n +  equations implied by equations 
(11) and (15). Imposing the symmetry condition i iw w w−= =  yields the economy-wide, 
equilibrium log nominal wage level as 
(16) ( )( ) ( )
11 1 0
1 1
w
η α η ασ γφ η ασ η
⎞⎛ − −⎞⎛= − >⎟⎜⎟⎜ ⎟+ − −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
After substituting the optimal value of w given by (16) and the optimal value of m given by 
(11) into equations (6) and (7), equilibrium inflation and unemployment in the 
macroeconomy are  
(17) 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( )
1 1
0
1 1
ασ η α η α φ αφπ γη ασ η φ
− − − − += ≥− − +  
(18) 
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 1
0
1
U
ασ η α η γη ασ η
− − −= >− − . 
Since the central bank’s preferred inflation rate was normed to zero, equation (17) shows that 
an inflation bias exists, which represents an inefficient outcome of the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium that increases the central bank’s disutility without affecting a union’s felicity. 
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The bias declines with increases to central bank “conservativeness,” 7 with increases to wage 
setting centralization, and with increases to product market competition: 
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )2
1 1
0
1 1
α η η ασπ γφ φ ασ η η
− − −∂ = <∂ + − −  
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )2
1 1
0
1 1
α φ α α η ηπ αγσ φ η ασ η
− − − −∂ = <∂ + + −  
( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )2
1 1 1
0
1 1
α φ α σ ασπ αγη φ αη η η
− − − −∂ = <∂ + − + .  
Since the conservativeness parameter, φ , is the only term dependent on the central bank’s 
preferences, it is clear from (18) that systematic monetary policy cannot affect the real 
economy, represented here by the unemployment rate (U). Hence, in the flexible wage Nash 
regime we obtain the standard Barro-Gordon results of inflation bias and real-side policy 
neutrality, notwithstanding the complications to the economic environment introduced by the 
presence of a multiplicity of unions in the labor market and monopolistic price competition in 
product markets. However, unemployment decreases as both centralization (coordination) of 
wage setting and product market competition increase: 
( )( )
( )( )2
1
0
1
U α η η αγσ αη η η
− −∂ = <∂ − +  
( )( )
( )( )2
1 1
0
1
U σ ασ αγη αη η η
− −∂ = <∂ − + .  
At 1σ =  or η = ∞ , unemployment falls to its single union – competitive market minimum, 
( )1U α γ= − , which for given productivity of labor, α , increases linearly with the weight γ  
attached to the real wage premium relative to unemployment. Note that ( )1U α γ= −  is not 
the “perfect competition” outcome. Unemployment goes to the competitive equilibrium 
0U =  only when unions with monopoly wage power place no weight on achieving a real 
wage above that warranted by productivity, that is, only when 0γ = . 
4.3  Rigid labor markets  
                                                          
7 Note that the bias asymptotes to zero when the central bank becomes “ultra-conservative,” that is, when the 
bank’s utility weight on inflation approaches it upper limit β = ∞  and, therefore, the conservativeness policy 
parameter approaches its upper limit ( )/ 1φ α α= − . 
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The rigid labor market or “Stackelberg” equilibrium is found in the usual way by solving the 
two-stage game by backward induction.8 In the second stage the central bank solves its 
problem taking nominal wages set by unions as given, which yields the optimal wage-
contingent monetary policy rule of equation (11). In the first stage each union solves its 
problem by internalizing the central bank’s reaction function (11), in the light of equations 
(6), (9) and the given wage claims of other unions. After substitution of the appropriate wage 
derivatives into (13), we derive the following realization of union i’s optimal wage condition:  
(19) 
( )
( )
1 2
2
1 1
1 0i i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
U w w
w w
w p w
w w
U w
πγ κ κ
κ γ
κ κ
−
−
⎞⎛ ∂ ∂− − − =⎟⎜ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂ − ∂⇒ = + ∂ ∂
     for { }1, 2,...i n∈  
with
 
( )( )1 1κ η ασ η θ σφ= − − + ,  ( )( )( ) ( )2 1 1 1κ α σ η θ σ φ= − − − − .  
Equation (19) represents a system of n equations. By imposing the symmetry condition 
i iw w w−= =  and solving, we obtain the economy-wide equilibrium log nominal wage as  
(20) 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
0
1 1 1
w
α φ αφ σ α α η γη σ α φ αφ ασ φ φ
− − + + −= >− − + + + + . 
Inflation and unemployment in the macroeconomy may be derived directly from equation 
(20) given equations (6), (7), and (11). We have  
(21) 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
0
1 1 1
α φ αφ σ α φ αφ α α ηπ γη σ α φ αφ ασ φ φ
− − + − + + −= ≥− − + + + +  
(22) 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
0
1 1
U
α φ αφ σ α α η γη α φ αφ σ ασ φ
− − + + −= >− − + + + . 
As in the flexible wage regime, equation (21) shows that in rigid wage labor markets optimal 
policy again creates an inflation bias that declines with central bank conservativeness, wage 
setting centralization, and product market competition: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ){ }
2
22
1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1
0
1 1 1 1
n σ α φ αα η η
ασ φ σ φ α α φ α απ γφ φ ασ φ η σ α φ α
⎧ ⎫+ − − +⎪ ⎪− − ⎨ ⎬+ ⋅ − − − − + +⎪ ⎪∂ ⎩ ⎭= <∂ + + + − − −
 
                                                          
8 Strictly speaking we have a three stage game with firms moving last to set fully flexible prices that are 
perfectly anticipated and internalized by unions and the monetary authority. Our focus is on union-central bank 
interactions and nothing is lost by abstracting from the price setting stage. 
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( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ }2
1 1
0
1 1 1
α φ α α η ηπ αγσ ασ φ η σφ α ασ
− − − −∂ = <∂ + + + − −
 
( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }2
1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1 1
α φ α σ ασ σφ απ αγη φ ασ φ η σφ α ασ
− − − − + −∂ = <∂ + + + + − −
.  
Equation (21) also implies that the inflation bias again goes to zero when the central bank 
becomes ultra-conservative, that is as β → ∞  and ( )/ 1φ α α→ − .  
Unlike the situation in the flexible wage regime, however, equation (22) shows that 
unemployment in the rigid wage regime is a negative function of central bank 
conservativeness φ   
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ }2
1 1
0
1 1 1
U σ σ α η η αγφ ασ φ η σφ α ασ
− − −∂ == <∂ + + − − −
.9 
Hence, monetary policy is non-neutral, and conservative monetary policy is able to achieve 
both lower inflation and lower unemployment when wages are pre-committed vis-à-vis 
monetary policy. Unemployment also falls, as in the flexible wage case, with increases to 
union centralization and product price competition: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ){ }2
1 1
0
1 1 1
U φ α η η αγσ σ φ η σ α φ α
+ − −∂ = <∂ + + − − −
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ){ }2
1 1 1
0
1 1 1
U σ σ α φ α αγη ασ φ η σ α φ α
− − − −∂ = <∂ + + − − −
. 
 
5.  Summary and interpretation of results 
The general pattern of macroeconomic outcomes associated with flexible and rigid wage 
labor market regimes, along with those associated with the limiting cases of a completely 
centralized wage setting and perfectly competitive product markets, are summarized in Table 
1.  
 
 
                                                          
9 Note however that this effect goes to zero as wage setting centralization σ  goes to 1 (all wages are set by a 
single union) or to 0 (all wages are set individually). We discuss this below. 
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Table 1.  Parameter effects on inflation and unemployment in various settings* 
 (a) 
Flexible wage 
regime 
(“Nash”) 
(b) 
Rigid wage 
regime 
(“Stackelberg”)
(c) 
Single union 
( 1σ = ) 
(d) 
Perfect 
competition 
(η = ∞ )  
 
 π U π U π U π U 
 
Parameter effects 
 
        
Monetary policy 
conservativeness, φ   
 − N − − − N − N 
Product market  
price competition, η 
 
− − − − N N   
Union wage centralization, σ 
 
− − − −   N N 
Union real wage weight, γ 
 
+ + + + + + + + 
*The table reports the sign of the effect of increases in the parameters in the first column on inflation 
(π) and unemployment (U). N indicates no effects. The outcomes associated with cases (c) and (d) are 
independent of the wage regimes. 
 
The first row of Table 1 indicates that the degree of central bank conservativeness always 
affects inflation, but has capacity to affect unemployment (the real economy) only if a 
multiplicity of uncoordinated unions pre-commit wages in an economy with less than 
perfectly competitive product markets. The other rows show the signs of the effects of 
product market competition, wage setting centralization, and the weight unions place upon 
real wage premiums as compared to unemployment — none of which depend on the 
operative wage regime. Rows 2 and 3 imply that increasing either product market 
competition or wage setting coordination reduces both inflation and unemployment in the 
both flexible and rigid wage regimes. Note that the size of unions (the degree of 
centralization of wage setting) affects macroeconomic outcomes only if firms exert market 
power over product prices, that is when η < ∞ . Similarly, the degree of market competition 
affects outcomes only if there is a multiplicity of unions (less than full coordination of wage 
setting), 1σ < . Absent either a multiplicity of unions or imperfect product competition, 
monetary policy is neutral.  
Row 4 reflects the usual consequences of union emphasis on real wages under a diminishing 
returns production technology and a downward sloping demand for labor. The greater the 
weight placed on the (net of productivity) real wage relative to unemployment, the higher are 
both unemployment and inflation in all types of labor and product markets. The overall 
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pattern of results delivers quite standard inferences: A low unemployment and low inflation 
macroeconomy are promoted by conservative, anti-inflation central bankers, highly 
competitive product markets, and highly coordinated unions that place relatively small weight 
on real wage premiums as compared to unemployment.  
The more illuminating issue of whether rigid or flexible wage labor markets deliver “better” 
macroeconomic performance depends on the central bank’s inflation aversion. It is clear from 
previous analyses that comparative statics of the parametric results are cumbersome, and so 
the topic is more informatively addressed by graphical analysis of simulated outcomes. In 
order to evaluate the quantitative impact of monetary policy under different wage formation 
regimes we need to pin down values of some parameters, and to limit the range of others. 
5.1  Baseline parameter settings 
Labor’s share of income in developed economies generally lies in the vicinity of two-thirds of 
GDP, so we set the productivity parameter to 2 3α =  in all simulation experiments.10 Price 
elasticities of demand, even for sectors producing relatively elastic goods and services, are in 
general unlikely to exceed 1.5, and only infrequently to exceed 2.0. We use a baseline setting 
for 1.3η =  in some simulations, and investigate the effects of values spanning 1.1 to 2.0 in 
another.11  
Wage formation in developed European market economies is typically dominated by 2 to 3 
large unions,12 which implies a representative value of 0.4σ =  for the wage setting 
centralization parameter.13 A labor force organized by one all-encompassing union (or a 
degree of inter-union coordination that amounts to the same thing) has never existed in a 
democratic capitalist economy, and likely never will. Even during the heydays of “solidarity” 
bargaining in Scandinavia there were two principal peak unions whose wage policies were 
only partly synchronized. In simulations investigating the quantitative impact of wage 
centralization we analyze values of σ  spanning 0.20 to 0.8; the highest setting is taken to 
                                                          
10 Note however that α  can be equated to labor’s share only under perfect competition. When firms have 
market power, the share tends to understate the output elasticity of labor input. For our purposes the baseline 
value adopted suffices however. 
11 As shown in the Appendix (and as in any case is well known), the optimal markup of price over marginal cost 
among firms with market power is 
1
11 η
−⎞⎛ − ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
. Calibrated analyses by Gordi (1995) produced markups in the 
range 2.2 to 4.5, which correspond to values of η  spanning 1.3 to 1.8, which are covered by our settings. 
12 Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002). 
13 However see the remarks ahead about effective centralization under a monetary union. 
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represent the effective degree of wage setting coordination in a labor market with two, less 
than fully coordinated peak unions.  
Recent econometric estimates of average equilibrium unemployment rates in European 
economies under the policies, labor market institutions and product market conditions 
prevailing in the late 1990’s fall in a fairly broad range – between 5% and 8.5%.14 For that 
range of empirical estimates, calculations based on our parameterizations of equilibrium 
unemployment imply that the weight placed by unions on the net-of-productivity real wage 
premium likely falls in the interval [ ]0.1, 0.15γ ∈ , given a labor input elasticity in the vicinity 
of 2 3α = . We study the effects of a somewhat broader range [ ]0.075, 0.175γ ∈ , but we use 
0.125γ =  (that is, a targeted real wage premium of 12.5%) as the baseline setting in 
simulations fixing the value of this parameter.  
Central bank behavior, on the other hand, appears empirically to have spanned far more of its 
theoretical domain than other variable parameters in the model. At various times during pre-
EMU period in Europe, the monetary policies of Banca d’Italia probably came closer than the 
policies of other monetary authorities in developed economies to ultra-liberal, near full 
accommodation of wage inflation, represented in the model by 0β ≈  and 1φ ≈ − .15 At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the Deutsche Bundesbank generally pursued very restrictive 
policies, as has the European Central Bank since the monetary union. In these cases, the 
posture of policies was probably not been too far from the ultra-conservative limit β = ∞ , 
( )1φ α α= − . 
5.2  Model simulations 
Figure 1 shows graphs of inflation and unemployment outcomes in flexible and rigid wage 
labor market regimes in relation to the full range of monetary policy conservativeness when 
other parameters are set to baseline values. The model simulations indicate that moderately 
conservative monetary policies yield low single-digit inflation rates and unemployment rates 
in the 6-8% range, as opposed low double-digit inflation and unemployment rates of 8-10% 
under moderately liberal monetary policies. The simulations deliver quantitative results 
broadly consistent with experience in EU economies, which implies that the baseline 
parameter settings are credible.  
                                                          
14 See, for example, Douven (2002) and Logeay and Tober (2003) 
15 The liberal limits proper are ruled out because at 0, 1β φ= = −  and inflation goes to infinity. See equations 
(17) and (21). 
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Figure 1.  Inflation and Unemployment in Flexible and Rigid Wage Regimes as 
Monetary Policy Conservativeness Increases *  
 
 
(1a)      (1b) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Percentage inflation rates and percentage point rates of unemployment are log approximations and were 
generated by parameter settings 2 3α = , 0.125γ = , 0.4σ =  and 1.3η =  as φ  goes from its lower bound, –1, 
to its upper limit, ( )1 2α α− = . The ultra-liberal lower bound of conservativeness is truncated in 1(a) because 
π → ∞  as 1φ → − . 
 
We know from equations (17) and (21) that in both flexible and rigid wage regimes inflation 
declines with central bank conservativeness φ . Analysis of those equations shows that when 
monetary policy is liberal or “populist” ( 0φ < ), inflation is lower in flexible wage than in a 
rigid wage regimes. However, if policy is conservative ( 0φ > ), the opposite is true and 
inflation is lower in rigid regimes than in flexible ones. But the quantitative differences are 
small to vanishing for plausible parameter settings, and they cannot be detected at all from 
the inflation graph lines in Figure 1(a) where policy is in the moderately liberal to ultra-
conservative range ( .5φ > − ). When policy is passive and therefore does not respond to 
nominal wage developments ( 0φ = ), inflation naturally converges across wage formation 
regimes. Inflation outcomes across regimes also converge to zero when policy approaches the 
ultra-conservative maximum ( )1φ α α= − . 
Equation (18) showed that unemployment is unresponsive to systematic monetary policy in 
flexible wage regimes, whereas eq. (22) implies that in rigid wage regimes unemployment is 
a decreasing convex function of central bank conservativeness. Analysis readily demonstrates 
that if monetary policy is liberal, unemployment equilibriums are always higher in 
Stackelberg, rigid wage environments than in Nash, flexible wage ones. When monetary is 
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conservative, the pattern is reversed and rigid wage systems yield superior unemployment 
(employment) outcomes. Moreover, by contrast to the inflation outcomes, the differences 
become large as monetary policy deviates significantly in either a liberal or conservative 
direction from the passive policy posture of 0φ = . Figure 1(b) depicts the pattern of results 
scaled to baseline values of model parameters. 
The explanations for the patterns in Figure 1 can be traced to the monetary transmission 
mechanisms and associated incentives of unions to pursue ambitious wage policies in 
different institutional settings. Under monopolistic price competition and a multiplicity of 
atomistic unions, the contribution of union-specific nominal wages, iw , to the general price 
level, p , is small by comparison to its impact on firm-specific product prices, ijp . Each 
uncoordinated union rationally exploits the wedge between log real consumption wage 
received by its members, ( )iw p− , and the log real product wage faced by individual firms, 
( )i ijw p− , by increasing nominal wages in order to achieve higher real wages, discounting 
the impact of its behavior on the general price level and, therefore, on the real wages of other 
unions. Since all unions behave in like fashion, the ensuing increase to the general price level 
(eq. 6) reduces aggregate demand via the negative effect on real money balances (eqs. 1, 
A.11), which in turn pushes up unemployment (eq. 5).  
In a flexible wage Nash regime, unions interact simultaneously with the central bank, and 
take the money supply, along with the wages of other unions, as given. Union nominal wage 
policies are therefore unaffected by systematic monetary policy reactions (eq. 15). Even a 
Draconian anti-inflation policy is unable to overcome any of the unemployment costs created 
by the wage behavior of uncoordinated individual trade unions (eq. 18) pursuing best-reply 
Nash strategies. By contrast in a rigid wage Stackelberg regime, unions internalize reactions 
of the central bank (eq. 11), and this affects their strategic calculations. The unemployment 
effects of union wage policies are either aggravated or mitigated, depending on the posture of 
policy.  
Each union in a rigid wage labor market takes account of the fact that a liberal central bank 
reacts to nominal wage rises with an accommodating expansion of the money supply ( )0φ <  
that yields higher inflation for given a wage increase (eq. 21). Unions internalize the 
anticipated higher price level, which raises the optimal nominal wage consistent with their 
real wage-unemployment objectives (eqs. 13, 19-20), thereby magnifying both the inflation 
bias and aggregate unemployment costs associated with decentralized wage formation (eqs. 
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21-22). Under liberal monetary policies both economy-wide inflation (eq. 6) and 
unemployment (eq. 7) are therefore higher when nominal wages are rigid as compared to 
being flexible, as depicted in Figure 1.  
Analogously, unions in rigid wage regimes internalize the fact that a conservative central 
bank reacts to nominal wage increases with a non-accommodating contraction of the money 
supply ( 0φ > ). Monetary contractions negatively affect inflation (the general price level) and 
this raises the real wage premium and the ensuing unemployment induced by a given increase 
to the nominal wage. As a result the real wage satisfying every union’s optimality condition 
can be achieved with smaller nominal wage increases (eq. 19). Hence by assuring some 
degree of price stability (a low inflation bias), the central bank partly alleviates the negative 
employment externality arising from decentralized wage formation. Consequently, both 
inflation and unemployment are lower than when wages are set independently of anticipated 
policy reactions. 
Intuition is deepened by evaluation of each union’s optimal condition for nominal wage 
setting given by equation (13). The first order condition 1 0ii
i i
Up U
w w
γ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂− − =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  implies that 
unemployment of union i’s members is proportional to the implicit marginal rate of 
substitution between the real wage premium and unemployment embedded in the union’s 
preference function: 1 ii
i i
p UU
w w
γ ⎞⎛ ∂ ∂⇒ − ⎟⎜ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ . In flexible wage regimes, optimal wage setting 
and, consequently, unemployment among union i’s members is policy-independent 
(independent of φ ) 
(24) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
i
i
i i w flex
p w
U w
γ ασ γ
η ασ η α η α
− ∂ ∂ −=∂ ∂ − − + − . 
However in rigid wage regimes wage setting it is policy-dependent  
(25) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
1 11
1 1
i
i
i i w rigid
p w
U w
ασ σφ α γγ
η ασ η α η α σφ
− + −− ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ − − + − +  
and so the unemployment rate each union falls as the restrictiveness of monetary policy 
increases 
( )1
0i
i
i i w rigid
p w
U w
γ
φ
− ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ <∂ . Moreover, in a rigid wage labor market each union’s 
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marginal rate of substitution is (1) greater than its marginal rate of substitution would be in a 
flexible wage market when 0φ < , (2) equal to it when 0φ = , and (3) less than its marginal 
rate of substitution would be in a flexible wage market when 0φ > . Since all unions behave 
symmetrically, we obtain the macroeconomic outcomes associated with rigid and flexible 
wage regimes described above and graphed in Figure 1. 
Figures 2-4 graph unemployment outcomes in rigid and flexible wage regimes in relation to 
the full range of central bank conservativeness and constrained variation in the remaining 
model parameters σ , η  and γ . We focus on unemployment outcomes alone because the 
responses of inflation to plausible variations of all model parameters do not yield sizeable 
differences across wage setting regimes. As in the baseline results graphed in Figure 1, it is 
on the real side of the economy – represented in our model by the unemployment rate – 
where big differences in monetary effects emerge in rigid as compared to flexible wage labor 
markets.  
The results graphed in Figure 1(b), as well as the results of the previous comparative statics, 
implied that the influence of monetary policy on relative unemployment outcomes originates 
with the way that systematic central bank reactions to wage changes affect unions’ strategic 
calculations in rigid wage labor markets. It is clear from Figures 2-4 that under almost all 
reasonable variations of wage setting centralization, product price competition, and union real 
wage orientation, the effects activist monetary policies on unemployment performance in 
rigid wage regimes are several percentage points in magnitude, even when the monetary 
policy reaction function m wφ= −  is evaluated within a truncated range that likely 
corresponds to nearly all empirical experience, [ ]0.5, 1.5φ ∈ − .16 
Figure 2 shows the response of unemployment rates to monetary policy as union 
centralization varies over empirically relevant values. When unions are big and therefore set 
wages for a large fraction of the labor force, they understand that their wage policies have 
great impact on the general price level and, consequently, that the wedge between product 
real wages and consumption real wages opened up by nominal wage increases is 
correspondingly small. Hence, in both rigid and flexible wage environments, large unions 
correctly perceive that the real wage return to aggressive nominal wage policies is 
comparatively weak, especially in relation to the utility cost of wage-induced increases to 
                                                          
16 At 2 3α = , the corresponding range of the central bank’s utility weight on inflation as compared to 
unemployment is [ ]1.8, 45β ∈ . 
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unemployment among union members (eqs. 8-9). Union size (centralization or coordination 
of wage setting) therefore tempers optimal wage aspirations, yielding lower firm-level price 
rises and lower union-level unemployment as centralization of wage setting increases – the 
right-sides of equations (24) and (25) both decline as σ  rises. Consequently, as shown 
analytically in section 4 by the comparative statics for equations (17)-(18) and (21)-(22), 
economy-wide rates of inflation and unemployment fall in both wage setting regimes with 
greater centralization of nominal wage formation. 
In rigid wage systems, however, the effects of union centralization interact with the 
restrictiveness of monetary policy, and this can create large differences in unemployment 
outcomes across wage setting regimes. At any given degree of centralization, the 
internalization of liberal policies by unions that pre-commit nominal wages, rationally leads 
to more aggressive wage policies as monetary policy becomes more accommodating, and this 
yields rates of inflation and unemployment that always exceed the corresponding rates in 
flexible wage regimes where the money supply is taken as given. The otherwise beneficial 
effects of wage setting centralization are eroded completely as policy approaches the ultra-
liberal limit 1φ = − , which is depicted by the converging graph lines in Figure 2 for 
unemployment outcomes in rigid wage labor markets at large negative values of φ . 
Figure 2.  The Effects of Monetary Policy Conservativeness on Unemployment by 
Variation in Centralization of Wage Setting* 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Percentage point rates of unemployment are log approximations and were generated by parameter 
settings 2 3α = , 0.125γ =  and 1.3η = as φ  goes from its lower bound, –1, to its upper limit, ( )1 2α α− =  for 
various degrees of wage setting centralization, σ . Rigid wage outcomes are depicted by the convex graph lines; 
flexible wage outcomes by the parallel lines. 
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The reverse is true in rigid wage labor markets when policy is conservative and the central 
bank contracts the money supply in proportion to nominal wage increases. The bigger (or 
more coordinated) are unions, the greater is the internalization of anti-inflation monetary 
policies, and the lower are rates of unemployment (and inflation) by comparison to outcomes 
in flexible wage labor markets, as Figure 2 shows. However, central bank conservativeness is 
only a second best way of solving coordination problems among atomistic unions. The lowest 
rate of unemployment attainable by an ultra-conservative central bank operating in a rigid 
wage regime is ( )( ) ( )
1
1
1
U
η α α α γη α ασ
− += −− + , which exceeds the single union-perfect 
competition minimum ( )1U α γ= −  by a factor that declines as wage setting becomes more 
centralized. At the limit, when all wages are set by one all-encompassing union −  that is, as 
1σ →  or, equivalently, as the wage behavior of notionally independent unions becomes 
perfectly coordinated which amounts to the same thing −  monetary policy no longer affects 
union wage policies because a single union fully internalizes on its own the macroeconomic 
consequences of its nominal wage behavior. Consequently monetary policy is neutral.17 (See 
row 1, column c of Table 1) However, as mentioned before, complete centralization of wage 
setting has never been observed in a market economy. 
 
Note that the establishment of a monetary union – notably the EMU – effectively decreases 
wage setting centralization because the nominal wage rises obtained by even the largest 
national unions have comparatively small effect on the union-wide wage and price levels and, 
consequently, have correspondingly small influence on union-wide monetary policy. Ceteris 
paribus, monetary union therefore tends to raise equilibrium unemployment,18 unless there 
are offsetting changes elsewhere in the macro political economy. One offsetting change could 
be – and, in fact, has been in the case of the EMU – a shift to more conservative monetary 
policy (bigger φ ) facing unions of the typical member nation. Another is a parallel increase 
                                                          
17 Another way to think about this, which originates with an insight of an anonymous reviewer, is that the 
presence of a multiplicity (“n”) of uncoordinated unions – defined by 1 1
n
σ = <  – amounts also to saying that 
each union behaves as if it were the only Stackelberg leader. Alternatively, if each union were to internalize the 
behavior of the others in its wage setting behavior, policy would again be neutral. As noted in the main text, 
such behavior defines perfect wage coordination and is functionally equivalent to σ =1 (n=1). Note too that 
policy becomes neutral as 0σ → ( n L→ → ∞ ), that is, when the wage setting is completely atomized so that 
the impact of any individual wage on economy-wide aggregates is negligible.  
18 This potential effect of monetary union appears to have been identified first by Hall (1994), and was 
subsequently discussed by Hall and Franzese (1998), Soskice and Iversen (1998) and Cukierman and Lippi 
(2001). 
 22
in market competition (bigger η ), which also has been an integral feature of the deepening of 
the European Community project.19  
Figure 3 shows that the direct impact of product market price competition on 
unemployment20 and on the efficacy of restrictive policy in driving down unemployment are 
very big at plausible settings of model parameters. In rigid wage labor markets, where 
monetary policy has capacity to influence union wage claims, unemployment is again 
exacerbated if policy is “populist” and is improved if policy is conservative. However note 
that policy exerts more potent effects on unemployment as product markets become less 
competitive – the convex graph lines get steeper as η  decreases. The reason is that relatively 
small values of η  (less market competition) yield relatively high monopoly rents to firms 
and, therefore, higher wages to unionized workers, which in turn raises unemployment.21  
Figure 3.  The Effects of Monetary Policy Conservativeness on Unemployment by 
Variation in Product Market Competition* 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Percentage point rates of unemployment are log approximations and were generated by parameter 
settings 2 3α = , 0.125γ =  and 0.4σ =  as φ  goes from its lower bound, –1, to its upper limit, ( )1 2α α− =  
for various elasticities of price competition, η . Rigid wage outcomes are depicted by the convex graph lines; 
flexible wage outcomes by the parallel lines. 
 
Policy looses potency as markets become more competitive. Although we consider a relative 
price elasticity of product demand of 2.0 to be a reasonable upper limit, if competition were 
to become much fiercer, for example because of government policies that dramatically 
                                                          
19Holden (2005) analyzes the incentives that monetary union may create for national unions to increase wage 
coordination, which in our model means raising the effective magnitude of σ . 
20 Raw empirical data reported in OECD (2003) show large, monotonic responses of employment to product 
market liberalization between 1978 and 1998 in 21 countries.  
21 For extended analysis see Nickell (1999). 
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reduced barriers to trade and market entry,22 monetary policy would become irrelevant to 
unemployment performance in rigid wage regimes, where otherwise it exerts great effects. 
Firms charging non-competitive prices would be driven to bankruptcy and labor would be 
reallocated to surviving producers, no matter what the wage inflation posture of the central 
bank. The ensuing uniformity of product prices would eliminate the wage wedge, thereby 
nullifying the incentive of unions to pursue wage policies exploiting a gap between the real 
consumption wage and the real product wage. At the perfect competition limit η = ∞ , 
unemployment falls to ( )1U α γ= −  at all values of φ . 
Figure 4 graphs simulations of the unemployment effects of variations in the weight unions 
attach to real wage premiums. γ  is a parameter that distorts competitive outcomes in labor 
markets, in that it represents the willingness of unions to impose wage levels exceeding the 
underlying productivity of the (given) labor force, thus driving unemployment above the 
perfect competition equilibrium 0U = .23  An important message of Figure 4 is that 
unemployment outcomes are very sensitive to union real wage objectives. Across plausible 
settings for γ , which in our simulations imply union real wage goals that range from 7.5 to 
17.5 percentage points above the market clearing level, equilibrium unemployment rates shift 
by as much as 7 percentage points.  
γ  is directly analogous to the status of η  in product markets, and it interacts with monetary 
policy conservativeness in much the same fashion as η .24 Hence monetary policy exerts 
greatest effects when union goals are most distorting – that is, at the larger values of γ . As γ  
gets small, union wage behavior corresponds more on its own to competitive behavior and 
the conditioning effects of policy dissipate, just as is the case when the product price 
competition parameter η  gets large.  
In principle γ  should be seen as a behavioral parameter, rather than a deep structural 
parameter like α . Hence the relative weight unions’ attach to real wages as opposed to 
unemployment in the determination of their nominal wage policies is subject to planned 
adjustment, although we make no attempt in this paper to model the internal dynamics of 
unions that might help explain revisions of their utility programs. 
                                                          
22 See, for example, the analysis of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). 
23 Recall that productivity growth and the equilibrium rate of unemployment under pure competition are both 
normalized to zero in our model.  
24 Blanchard and Philippon (2003) analyze a model in which the union utility weight on the real wage level 
declines with union beliefs about the degree of product market competition. In our setting that would make γ  
proportional to η , rather than being an independent parameter with separable effects. 
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Figure 4.  The Effects of Monetary Policy Conservativeness on Unemployment by 
Variation in Union Real Wage Weights* 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Percentage point rates of unemployment are log approximations and were generated by parameter settings 
2 3α = , 0.4σ =  and 1.3η = as φ  goes from its lower bound, –1, to its upper limit, ( )1 2α α− =  for various 
magnitudes of union real wage utility weights, γ . Rigid wage outcomes are depicted by the convex graph lines; 
flexible wage outcomes by the parallel lines.  
 
6.  Summary and conclusions  
In this paper we applied a standard model of an economy with imperfectly competitive 
markets for goods and labor in which a central bank and several unions strategically interact. 
Unions set wages and firms set prices, subject to downward sloping labor and product 
demand functions. We used this workhorse model to investigate the macroeconomic 
consequences of monetary policy rules in two distinct labor market regimes: A rigid wage 
(“Stackelberg”) regime with binding contracts precluding nominal wages from being adjusted 
contemporaneously to variations of the money supply, and a flexible wage (“Nash”) regime 
where unions and the central bank simultaneously determine nominal wages and the money 
supply, respectively, in light of each other’s best response policies.  
If only one union is present in the labor market, or if product markets are perfectly 
competitive so that firms face a relative price elasticity of demand approaching infinity, 
neutrality holds no matter which wage formation regime is in place – systematic monetary 
policy affects inflation but not unemployment. However, in more realistic situations in which 
several unions are involved in wage setting and firms have at least some price setting market 
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power, monetary policy has real effects in rigid wage regimes whenever the authorities 
employ a systematic policy rule. By contrast, in flexible wage regimes the monetary authority 
is unable to influence real variables. The real effects of monetary policy rules depend on 
wage setting institutions. 
Our numerical results showed that conservative, restrictive monetary policies have great 
capacity to offset the potentially negative employment costs of decentralized bargaining 
when nominal wages are pre-committed and unions internalize systematic responses of the 
monetary authority to their wage setting behavior. Yet the very same internalization 
mechanism gives liberal, accommodating policies equally great capacity to aggravate 
unemployment arising from decentralized wage setting. In fact, at all combinations of wage 
setting centralization, product market competition, and the real wage orientation of union 
goals, liberal policies yield higher unemployment (and inflation) in a rigid wage labor 
markets than in flexible wage markets in which unions take the money supply as given. And, 
under plausible numerical settings of model parameters, the quantitative magnitudes were 
sizeable – generally amounting to several percentage points of unemployment.25 
Finally, our results imply that conservative, anti-inflationary monetary policies always 
dominate liberal policies, in the sense that inflation is always lower and unemployment is 
never higher under restrictive policy as compared to liberal policy. Yet if monetary policy 
were compelled by law, social norms, or some other reason to accommodate rising wages and 
prices, then macroeconomic performance would be enhanced by a flexible wage labor market 
in which unions had the institutional capacity to adjust wages continuously to realizations of 
the money supply. In this respect a flexible wage labor market without binding contracts is 
more compatible with monetary policies that systematically accommodate nominal wage 
expansions. 
                                                          
25 Our model implies that the effects of monetary policy in mixed systems – economies in which some wages 
are flexible and others are rigid and/or economies in which firms are endowed with quite different degrees of 
pricing power – are just weighted averages of outcomes of the sort depicted in Figures 1-4 – with weights equal 
to the shares contributed by wages set in various institutional configurations to the average, economy-wide 
wage. Waller (1992) focuses explicitly on a multi-sector economy. He analyzes monetary policy effects in an 
economy composed of a flexible wage (‘classical’) sector and a rigid wage (‘nonclassical’) sector that are 
endogenously connected via relative price effects. 
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Appendix:  The workhorse monopolistic competition model 
The appendix gives some additional details about the economic model used in the main text.  
The demand for firm ij’s product depends on its relative price and aggregate demand 
(A.1) ijdij
P MY
P P
η−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
where ijP  and P  are individual firm prices and the general price level, respectively. Firms are 
assumed distributed such that the general price level P is a geometric average of individual 
firm prices ijP . 1η >  is the relative price elasticity of product demand faced by each firm, 
and M
P
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
is the aggregate quantity of real money. With lower case letters denoting logs, the 
foregoing imply that log aggregate demand is just ( )dy m p= − . 
Each firm’s uses a production technology (with secular technological progress fixed at 1.0) 
employing labor inputs only that exhibit decreasing returns to scale 
(A.2) ij ijY L
α=   ( )0,1α ∈  
where ijY  and ijL  are the output supply and the labor input of firm ij. The production function 
implies that the labor requirement for any level of output is 
1/
ij ijL Y
α= . 
Firms maximize the real profit function 
(A.3) ij d iij ij ij
P WY L
P P
Π = − . 
The usual profit maximization condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost may thus 
be written 
(A.4) 
11 11ij i ij
P W Y
P P
α
αη α
−⎡ ⎤− =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
By substituting (A.1) into (A.4), we obtain the optimal relative price of firm ij as  
(A.5) 
( ) ( )
1
1 1ij iP W M
P P P
α α
α η α α η αμ
α
−
+ − + −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
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where 
1
11 1μ η
−⎛ ⎞= − >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  is the mark-up. Equation (A.5) states that the optimal relative price 
of firm ij rises with the real consumption wage of the firm’s workers and with aggregate real 
money balances.  
Equating (A.1) to (A.2) giving ij ij
P M L
P P
η
α
−⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and using (A.5) we can derive  the following 
expression for employment in firm ij 
(A.6) 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
i
ij
W ML
P P
η
α η α α η αμ
α
− + − + −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ . 
Taking logs of (A.6), we have firm ij’s log labor demand as 
(A.7) ( )( ) 01
id
ij
m p w p
l l
η ηα η α
− − −= −+ −  
where ( ) ( )( )0
ln ln
1
l
μ α
α η α
−= + −  is a location parameter that henceforth we neglect. Log relative 
price from (A.5) is therefore 
(A.8) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
1
i
ij
m p w p
p p
α α
α η α
− − + −− = + − . 
The conventional definition of the unemployment rate, 
( )S D
S
L L
U
L
−= , is closely 
approximated by the difference of log labor supply and log labor demand, s dl l− . Using 
(A.7) the unemployment rate U can be written 
(A.9) ( )( )1 iij ij
m p w p
U l
η
α η α
− − −= − + −  
where ijl  is log labor supply to firm ij. For simplicity we treat ijl  parametrically and 
normalize it to zero. The unemployment rate is therefore proportional to dijl− , which 
corresponds to equation (5) in the main text. Note that omitting ijl  and 0l  do not affect 
solutions for optimal programs because of the linear-quadratic functional forms of the 
objective functions (a proof is available by request), so these parameters y may be omitted 
without loss of generality. 
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Averaging (A.8) over firms and rearranging, we obtain the reduced form for the equilibrium 
general price level as 
(A.10) ( )1p w mα α= + −  
which in view of (A.2) and (A.7) implies that equilibrium log aggregate output is  
(A.11) ( )y m wα= − . 
Equilibrium aggregate unemployment (the negative of log aggregate labor demand) follows 
by taking the average of (A.9) and substituting for the log aggregate price level given by 
(A.10): 
(A.12) ( )U w m= − . 
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